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I.

INTRODUCTION

In Kingdomware Technologies, Inc. v. United States,1 the United
States Supreme Court unanimously overturned the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,2 as well as years of
deference to Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) practices, holding
that the VA must conduct market research to determine if at least two
service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses (SDVOSBs) or
veteran-owned small businesses (VOSBs) are capable of performing
a proposed procurement contract before it issues a solicitation.3 The
Court made this decision pursuant to the Veterans Benefits, Health
Care, and Information Technology Act of 2006 (Veterans Act),4
which requires the VA to restrict its competitive bidding process if at
least two businesses are found, even if the proposed procurement is
to be made through the General Services Administration’s (GSA)
Federal Supply Schedule program (FSS). This calculus is commonly
referred to as the “Rule of Two.”5

1. Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1969 (2016).
2. Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 754 F.3d 923 (Fed. Cir. 2014),
rev’d and remanded, 136 S. Ct. 1969.
3. Kingdomware, 136 S. Ct. at 1979.
4. 38 U.S.C. § 8127(d) (2012).
[A] contracting officer of the Department shall award contracts on the
basis of competition restricted to small business concerns owned and
controlled by veterans if the contracting officer has a reasonable
expectation that two or more small business concerns owned and
controlled by veterans will submit offers and that the award can be made
at a fair and reasonable price that offers best value to the United States.
Id.
5. For a detailed history of the Rule of Two, see infra Section II.C. The
following abbreviations are used regularly throughout this Note: EDWOSBs
(Economically Disadvantaged Women-Owned Small Businesses), FAR (Federal
Acquisitions Requirements), FSS (Federal Supply Schedule), GOA (Government
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If ever there was a chance for the judiciary to put “veterans
first,”6 this was it. While the result is a huge win for business-owning
veterans, who stand to reap significant monetary benefits,7 the
Kingdomware holding will likely have much further-reaching negative
effects on government contracting in general.8 The holding may also
impede the efficiency of an already overburdened VA in particular.9
Perhaps most significantly, the Kingdomware decision may negatively
affect other disadvantaged small business contractors.10 It is
therefore imperative that Congress take steps to correct the
problems that are likely to manifest in the coming years as a result of
the Court’s decision and restore some semblance of equity to the
VA’s contracting practices.

Accountability Office), GSA (General Services Administration), SBA (Small
Business Act), SDVOSBs (Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Businesses), VA
(Department of Veteran’s Affairs), VOSBs (Veteran-Owned Small Businesses), and
WOSBs (Women-Owned Small Businesses).
6. For an example of the legislature attempting to accomplish a similar result,
see Leo Shane III, Senators Push to Advance Sweeping Veterans Bill Before July 4, MILITARY
TIMES (June 23, 2016), http://www.militarytimes.com/story/veterans/2016/06/23
/senate-floor-push-veterans-first-act/86281538/.
7. See Steven Koprince, Victory! SDVOSBs Win in Kingdomware Supreme Court
Decision, SMALLGOVCON (June 16, 2016), http://smallgovcon.com/service-disabled
-veteran-owned-small-businesses/victory-sdvosbs-win-in-kingdomware-supreme
-court-decision/ (“[T]he Kingdomware decision will prove a major boon to SDVOSBs
and VOSBs, ultimately resulting in billions of extra dollars flowing to veteran-owned
companies.”).
8. See Beyond the Bench: Ramifications of the Supreme Court Kingdomware Decision:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Small Bus. and Entrepreneurship, 114th Cong. (2016)
[hereinafter Hearing], https://www.sbc.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2016/6
/beyond-the-bench-ramifications-of-the-supreme-court-kingdomware-decision
(statement of A. John Shoraka, Associate Administrator, Office of Government
Contracting and Business Development, at 3–4).
9. Brief for the United States at 39, Kingdomware Techs., Inc., v. United
States, 136 S. Ct. 1969 (2016) (No. 14-916), 2015 WL 5719745 (“The ability to place
orders under the FSS is often essential to the VA’s effective and expeditious
performance of its obligations to veterans.”).
10. Hearing, supra note 8 (statement of A. John Shoraka, Associate
Administrator, Office of Government Contracting and Business Development, at 3)
(“The limitation on the VA’s discretion to consider use of other small business
programs when the rule of two can be met by service disabled veteran owned small
businesses will likely affect the level of awards made by the VA to support WOSBs,
8(a) and SDBs, and HUBZone small businesses, all of which have experienced
important positive upward trends in recent years.”).
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This Note begins with an overview of the primary players in the
decade-long fight over government contract set-asides, a discussion
of the Rule of Two, the relevant law that spawned it, and the history
behind it.11 Next, the analysis moves to an in-depth exploration of
the judicial progression of Kingdomware and the Court’s reasoning.12
Then, this Note outlines the potential wide-reaching effects of the
Kingdomware holding with regard to veterans, the VA, other
government agency contracts, and nonveteran small businesses.13
Although these effects are concerning, efforts of Congress can solve
the outlined issues. This Note proposes such legislative remedies that
would restore smooth and equitable VA contracting while still
putting American veterans first.14 Finally, this Note concludes that
the Court’s legal analysis, while sound, creates several potential
issues for the VA and other government agencies.15 If Congress does
not act to rectify the situation, agencies may face inefficiencies and
discrepancies in current contract set-aside practices that require
legislative attention, and other disadvantaged small business
contractors will likely see a substantial decrease in governmentsourced opportunities.16
II. HISTORY
A.

The Federal Supply Schedule

While government contracting in America is a big business that
takes many forms, one common tool for government agencies is the
Federal Supply Schedule. The Court explained that “[t]he Federal
Supply Schedule (FSS) generally is a streamlined method for
Government agencies to acquire certain supplies and services in
bulk, such as office supplies or food equipment.”17 Prior to 1949,
“government agencies entered procurement contracts and
purchased supplies and services on an individual basis.”18 However,
“[o]ver time, federal contracting became more centralized. The
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra Section IV.A.
14. See infra Section IV.B.
15. See infra Sections IV.A.3, B.1.
16. See infra Part V.
17. Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1969, 1974 (2016)
(citing 48 C.F.R. § 8.402(a) (2015)).
18. Sharp Elecs. Corp. v. McHugh, 707 F.3d 1367, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
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Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 created the
GSA to standardize federal procurement processes and procure,
store, and distribute supplies to federal agencies.”19
Since its inception, the GSA has directed and managed the FSS20
with the purpose of increasing efficiency in the procurement process
for certain types of orders by having prenegotiated contracts
between vendors and the GSA rather than conducting a bidding
process for each individual order.21 Through the FSS, “[i]ndefinite
delivery contracts are awarded to provide supplies and services at
stated prices for given periods of time.”22
Prior to the enactment of the Veterans Benefits, Health Care,
and Information Technology Act of 2006,23 the FSS was “utilized as
a procurement method separate and apart from traditional
procurement methods and set-aside provisions found elsewhere in
the FAR [Federal Acquisitions Requirements].”24 The VA has
therefore relied on this historical understanding of the FSS and
repeatedly asserted that the Rule of Two25 does not apply to orders
made through the FSS.26 It is that very assertion that was overturned
by the Supreme Court in Kingdomware. This Note will now briefly
discuss the history of the VA and the ongoing tension between
government agencies, the Government Accountability Office
(GAO), SDVOSBs, and VOSBs that came to a head in Kingdomware.

19. Id. (citation omitted).
20. The FSS is established by 41 C.F.R. § 105-53.145. 41 C.F.R. § 105-53.145
(2016).
21. 48 C.F.R. § 8.402(a) (2016).
22. Id.
23. Veterans Benefits, Health Care, and Information Technology Act of 2006,
Pub. L. No. 109-461, §§ 502, 503, 120 Stat. 3403, 3431–36 (2006).
24. Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 107 Fed. Cl. 226, 231 (2012),
aff’d, 754 F.3d 923 (Fed. Cir. 2014), rev’d and remanded, 136 S. Ct. 1969 (2016); see
also K-Lak Corp. v. United States, 98 Fed. Cl. 1, 2 n.3 (2011) (“The competition
procedures in FAR Parts 13, 14, and 15 and the Small Business Program rules in
FAR Part 19 do not apply to orders placed against and fully within the scope of
existing FSS contracts.”).
25. See infra Section II.C.
26. See Kingdomware Techs., B-406507, 2012 WL 1942256, at *1–2 (Comp.
Gen. May 30, 2012); Aldevra, B-406205, 2012 WL 860813, at *3 (Comp. Gen. Mar.
14, 2012).
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The Department of Veterans Affairs

For many, the VA is a largely unknown government agency,
perhaps only recognized for scandals and administrative
shortcomings that the media sporadically covers.27 However, the VA
is actually a behemoth government agency that has a storied history,
enormous influence, and substantial resources. In fact, the VA is one
of the oldest and largest government agencies, tracing its roots back
to the American Revolution.28 Since its early beginnings, the VA has
continuously evolved and taken on increasing responsibility.
President Hoover created the modern VA in 1930 through a
consolidation of several agencies that administered veteran
benefits.29 In 1930, the VA was charged with providing medical
services for war veterans, disability compensation and allowances, life
insurance, and retirement and pension payments.30 At that point, it
had an operating budget of $786 million and was serving 4.6 million
veterans.31 In the years since, the VA has been elevated to a cabinet
level agency and has dramatically expanded its coverage and
services. The agency now has an operating budget of over $75 billion
and serves nearly twenty-five million veterans.32 It is therefore
evident that the VA has immense and wide-ranging influence as an
agency.
Considering the amount of money spent by the agency annually
and the huge number of veterans it services, the actions of the VA
have immediate and life-changing effects that cannot be
understated. While such a powerful government agency is not often
told what it can and cannot do by anyone other than Congress or the
President, the GAO recommended seventeen times that the VA
reconsider its position regarding the Rule of Two, and the VA

27. For a small sampling of the various scandals that have plagued the VA, see
Michael Pearson, The VA’s Troubled History, CNN (May 30, 2014 12:40 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/23/politics/va-scandals-timeline/.
28. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, VA HISTORY IN BRIEF,
https://www.va.gov/opa/publications/archives/docs/history_in_brief.pdf
(last
visited Mar. 30, 2017).
29. Id. at 12.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 31.
32. U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS FISCAL
YEAR
2017
BUDGET
REQUEST
FACT
SHEET
(2017),
https://www.va.gov/budget/docs/summary/Fy2017-VAsBudgetFactSheet.pdf.
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repeatedly refused.33 It is therefore important to understand what
purpose the GAO serves and what exactly its recommendations to
the VA mean in the context of Kingdomware.
C.

The Government Accountability Office

The GAO, often referred to as the “congressional watchdog,” is
an independent, nonpartisan agency that “investigates how the
federal government spends taxpayer dollars.”34 The GAO’s duty to
oversee and investigate is expressed through its power to issue legal
decisions and opinions regarding government agencies like the VA.
Relevant here, these legal decisions and opinions sometimes
manifest in the form of bid protest rulings.35 These rulings, however,
are not binding upon an agency; they are merely recommendations,
which the agency can then choose to follow or disregard.36 It is
important to note that, despite the optional nature of these
recommendations, “from 1997–2012, the GAO issued 5,703 merit
decisions and sustained 1099 protests; during that period, an agency
disregarded the GAO’s recommendation only ten times.”37 In
response to the VA’s position that it was not required to utilize the
Rule of Two in instances nearly identical to those in Kingdomware,
“the [GAO] . . . sustained more than seventeen protests,” and the VA
refused to follow every one of them.38
Although the VA was previously within its rights as an agency to
disregard the GAO’s recommendations, this is no longer the case.

33. Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 754 F.3d 923, 929 (Fed. Cir.
2014), rev’d and remanded, 136 S. Ct. 1969 (2016).
34. About GAO, GAO, http://www.gao.gov/about/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2017).
35. See id.
36. Kingdomware, 754 F.3d at 936 (“Although agencies often follow GAO
recommendations in bid protest decisions ‘given the GAO’s long experience and
special expertise in such . . . matters,’ . . . these recommendations are not binding
on an agency.” (quoting CMS Contract Mgmt. Servs. v. Mass. Hous. Fin. Agency, 745
F.3d 1379, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2014), cert denied sub nom. United States v. CMS Contract
Mgmt. Servs., 135 S. Ct. 1842 (2015))); see Honeywell, Inc. v. United States, 870 F.2d
644, 648 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (stating that agencies are not compelled to follow
recommendations from the Comptroller General).
37. CMS, 745 F.3d at 1384–85.
38. Kingdomware, 754 F.3d at 936; see Letter from Lynn H. Gibson, Gen. Couns.
for the GAO, to Sen. Daniel K. Inouye, Cong. Committee Chairman, et al. (Nov. 13,
2012), http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/649957.pdf.
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The Rule of Two is the statutory provision at the core of the
controversy in Kingdomware, and it is now mandatory.39
D.

The Rule of Two

The Rule of Two is a term commonly used to describe a
particular statutory provision that establishes government
procurement set-asides and restricts competitive bidding.40 This
standard, which first appeared within the FAR in 1984,41 requires a
government contracting officer to conduct market research to
determine if two or more contractors, who have been designated as
disadvantaged concerns,42 are capable of fulfilling the contract in
question. If such contractors are reasonably likely to bid, and they
can complete the procurement at a fair and reasonable price that
offers the best value to the United States, then the officer must
restrict the bidding process to those contractors.43 Although the FAR
statement of purpose instructs that “[c]ontracting officers shall

39. Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1969, 1979 (2016)
(“[W]e do not defer to the agency when the statute is unambiguous.”).
40. See generally Steven W. Feldman & Raymond Fioravanti, Contract Dispute or
Bid Protest? The Delex Systems Dilemma, 39 PUB. CONT. L.J. 483 (2010).
41. 48 C.F.R. § 19.502-2(b) (2016).
The contracting officer shall set aside any acquisition over $150,000 for
small business participation when there is a reasonable expectation
that—
(1) Offers will be obtained from at least two responsible small
business concerns offering the products of different small business
concerns . . . ; and
(2) Award will be made at fair market prices.
Id. A substantially similar provision was previously included in the Defense
Acquisition Regulation and the NASA Procurement Regulation. Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR) “Rule of Two”; Requirements for Setting Aside Acquisitions for
Small Business, 49 Fed. Reg. 40,135, 40,135 (Oct. 12, 1984).
42. These “concerns” include SDVOSBs; VOSBs; 8(a) small businesses, which
encompasses socially and economically disadvantaged groups; EDWOSBs; WOSBs;
HUBZone concerns; and local firms during a major disaster or emergency. See Social
Disadvantage Eligibility, SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://www.sba.gov/contracting
/government-contracting-programs/8a-business-development-program/eligibility
-requirements/social-disadvantage-eligibility (last visited Mar. 30, 2017); see also
Government Contracting Programs, SMALL BUS. ADMIN., https://www.sba.gov
/contracting/government-contracting-programs (last visited Mar. 30, 2017).
43. 48 C.F.R. § 19.502-2(b) (2016).
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provide for full and open competition,”44 this requirement is
exempted by § 6.203.45
The Rule of Two actually predates the FAR.46 Leading up to the
promulgation of the FAR, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy
sought comments on the rule’s inclusion within the new
regulation.47 Years earlier, in an effort to encourage the utilization
and growth of small businesses, Congress mandated certain annual
goals within the Small Business Act (SBA).48 As a benchmark, the
original goal for an agency contracting with veteran small business
concerns was “established at not less than 3 percent of the total value
of all prime contract awards for each fiscal year.”49 The inclusion of
the Rule of Two, therefore, is a mechanism that serves to meet these
goals.50 The underlying controversy in Kingdomware hinged on just
such a Rule of Two provision, which was included in the Veterans
Act of 2006.51

44. 48 C.F.R. § 6.101(b) (2014).
45. 48 C.F.R. § 6.203(a) (2016).
46. Delex Sys., Inc., B-400403, 2008 WL 4570635, at *6 (Comp. Gen. Oct. 8,
2008).
47. Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) “Rule of Two”; Requirements for
Setting Aside Acquisitions for Small Business, 49 Fed. Reg. 40,135, 40,135 (Oct. 12,
1984).
48. See 15 U.S.C. § 644(g)(1)(B) (2016).
Each agency shall have an annual goal that presents, for that agency, the
maximum practicable opportunity for small business concerns, small
business concerns owned and controlled by service-disabled veterans,
qualified HUBZone small business concerns, small business concerns
owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged
individuals, and small business concerns owned and controlled by
women to participate in the performance of contracts let by such agency.
Id.
49. Id. § 644(g)(1)(A)(i).
50. See 48 C.F.R. § 6.203(a) (“To fulfill the statutory requirements relating to
small business concerns, contracting officers may set aside solicitations to allow only
such business concerns to compete.”).
51. See 38 U.S.C. § 8127(d) (2012).
[A] contracting officer of the Department shall award contracts on the
basis of competition restricted to small business concerns owned and
controlled by veterans if the contracting officer has a reasonable
expectation that two or more small business concerns owned and
controlled by veterans will submit offers and that the award can be made
at a fair and reasonable price that offers best value to the United States.
Id.
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The Veterans Benefits, Health Care, and Information Technology Act
of 2006

Congress enacted the Veterans Act of 2006 in response to the
Federal Government’s continuous failure to meet the annual goals
for contracting with SDVOSBs, 52 which were established seven years
earlier in the Veterans Entrepreneurship and Small Business
Development Act.53 As noted, the Veterans Act of 2006 included the
Rule of Two provision that later became the subject of the
controversy in Kingdomware.54 While the Rule of Two itself does not
contain language limiting the application of set-asides to VA
procurements made through non-FSS contracts, “[i]n finalizing its
regulations meant to implement the Act, the [VA] stated in a
preamble that § 8127’s procedures ‘do not apply to [Federal Supply
Schedule] task or delivery orders.’”55
The VA’s position regarding the applicability of the Rule of Two
to FSS procurements is one of the most critical aspects of the
controversy underpinning Kingdomware. As previously stated, the VA
was brought before the GAO on numerous bid protests regarding
this very issue.56 Two such GAO bid protest rulings, Delex Systems57
and Aldevra,58 are fundamental to understanding the tension and
confusion that was building between United States agencies,
specifically the VA and the GAO, and veteran-owned government
contractors shortly before Kingdomware. This Note will now delve
briefly into the relevant facts and issues presented by these two
protests.

52. Veterans Benefits, Health Care, and Information Technology Act of 2006,
Pub. L. No. 109-461, §§ 502–03, 120 Stat. 3403, 3431–36 (2006).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 644(g)(1)(A)(ii); Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States,
136 S. Ct. 1969, 1973 (2016).
54. See supra notes 46–51 and accompanying text.
55. Kingdomware, 136 S. Ct. at 1974 (quoting VA Acquisition Regulation, 74
Fed. Reg. 64,619, 64,624 (2009)); see VA Acquisition Regulation, 74 Fed. Reg. at
64,626 (“VA will continue to follow GSA guidance regarding applicability of 48 CFR
part 19 of the FAR, Small Business Programs, which states that set-asides do not
apply to FAR part 8 FSS acquisitions.”).
56. See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.
57. Delex Sys., Inc., B-400403, 2008 WL 4570635 (Comp. Gen. Oct. 8, 2008).
58. Aldevra, B-405271 et al., 2011 WL 4826148 (Comp. Gen. Oct. 11, 2011).
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Delex Systems and Aldevra Bid Protests
1.

Delex Systems

The GAO decision in Delex Systems actually arose from a 2008 bid
protest by Delex Systems, Inc. against the Navy, not the VA.59 The
protest that the GAO sustained, however, was nearly identical to the
controversy in Kingdomware.60
The threshold question in Delex Systems was whether the Navy
was required to apply the set-aside provisions of § 19.502-2(b) of the
FAR—the Rule of Two—when soliciting multiple-award
procurements61 through the FSS.62 The Navy argued that its
obligation to follow FAR § 19.5 was based solely on FAR § 6.203(c),
which “requires contracting agencies to follow FAR Subpart 19.5.”63
The Navy then pointed to FAR § 16.505(b)(1)(ii), which states that
“the competition requirement in [FAR] Part 6 do[es] not apply to
the ordering process.”64 Therefore, if the Navy is not required to
follow FAR Part 6, it would not be required to follow FAR Subpart
19.5, which in turn frees it from complying with the Rule of Two
provision when placing orders through the FSS.65 Additionally, the
Navy asserted that Congress had “never indicated that the small
business set-aside requirements apply to the placement of task and
delivery orders, despite numerous opportunities to do so”; therefore,

59. Delex Sys., 2008 WL 4570635, at *1.
60. Both Delex Systems and Kingdomware dealt with issues concerning the Rule
of Two and a government agency’s refusal to limit the competitive bidding process
with respect to procurements made through the FSS ordering process.
61. “A multiple-award contract is a type of indefinite-quantity contract which is
awarded to several contractors from a single solicitation. Delivery of supplies, or
performance of services, is then made via an individual delivery/task order placed
with one of the contractors pursuant to procedures established in the contract.”
U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, Multiple-Award Contracts and Governmentwide Acquisition
Contracts Including Delivery Orders and Task Orders, in ACQUISITION GUIDE (2011),
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/16.5_Multiple-Award_Contracts_and
_Governmentwide_Acquisition_Contracts_Including_Delivery_Orders_and_Task
_Orders_0.pdf.
62. Delex Sys., 2008 WL 4570635, at *4.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
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the set-aside requirements do not apply to FSS ordering.66 The GAO
disagreed on all counts.67
First, the GAO reminded the Navy that all of the provisions in
question were statutory in nature and that each one was enacted in
order to implement the requirements of other acts.68 Next, the GAO
poked a significant hole in the Navy’s argument that
§ 16.505(b)(1)(ii) of the FAR carves out an exception for task and
delivery orders through the FSS by allowing the agency to disregard
Part 6 of the FAR and, by extension, the Rule of Two.69 The GAO
concluded that the Navy was “overread[ing] the provision,” because
“[w]hen an agency is placing task and delivery orders under
multiple-award contracts, it cannot, by definition, hold a full and
open competition as described by FAR Part 6.”70 It therefore stands
to reason that, when reading FAR § 16.505(b)(1)(ii) literally, the
provision stating that “[t]he competition requirements in Part 6 and
the policies in Subpart 15.3 do not apply to the ordering process”
means exactly what the plain language says: the competition
requirements of Part 6 do not apply to ordering.71 In light of this
seemingly unambiguous language, there was no reason to infer that
“exemption from the requirements of full and open competition . . .
can exempt agencies from the requirements of [the Rule of Two]
when placing orders.”72 Finally, the GAO pointed to § 816 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006,73 which
“required the Secretary of Defense to issue guidance on the use of
[the cascading set-aside clause] for assessing offers for contracts and
task and delivery orders.”74 To the GAO, this provision was clear

66. Id. at *6.
67. See id. at *4–6 (disagreeing with both arguments).
68. Id. at *4–5.
69. Id. at *5.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006, Pub. L. No. 109163, § 816, 119 Stat. 3136, 3382 (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 2305).
74. Delex Sys., 2008 WL 4570635, at *6; Pub. L. No. 109-163.
We note in particular that this enactment prescribes a prohibition on
the use of such schemes unless a contracting officer has “conducted
market research in accordance with part 10 of the Federal Acquisition
Regulation in order to determine whether or not a sufficient number of
qualified small businesses are available to justify limiting competition for
the award of such contract or task or delivery order under applicable law
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evidence that Congress had indeed “recognize[d] the possibility of
limiting competition for task and delivery orders to small businesses
when there is a sufficient number of small businesses to justify doing
so.”75 Based primarily on these conclusions, the GAO sustained
Delex’s protest and recommended that the Navy reevaluate its
practices in light of the decision.76
While the GAO’s decision in Delex Systems was not binding upon
the Navy, the Navy chose to follow the recommendation. This
acceptance is in contrast with the VA’s decision to disregard the
GAO’s recommendation in Aldevra, a decision that helped set the
stage for the dispute in Kingdomware.
2.

Aldevra

Aldevra was an SDVOSB concern that protested the VA’s
issuance of solicitations for a tilting skillet/braising pan, three
countertop electric griddles, and a food slicer in 2011.77 Similar to
the petitioner in Delex Systems, Aldevra claimed that a government
agency, the VA, had failed to comply with the applicable statutes by
not determining if the bidding for these procurements should be
limited by the Rule of Two.78 The GAO again sustained the protest.79
The issue in Aldevra was identical to that in Delex Systems:
“whether the [agency] is required to conduct market research to
determine if the procurements should be set aside for [small
business] concerns before using the FSS.”80 The VA, however, came
and regulations.”
Delex Sys., 2008 WL 4570635, at *6 (quoting National Defense Authorization Act,
§ 816(b)(1)).
75. Delex Sys., 2008 WL 4570635, at *6.
76. Id. Further adding to the confusion of this area of law, in 2014 the GAO
actually overturned its decision in Delex Systems, citing a change in the statutory
language of FAR § 19.502-4. See Edmond Sci. Co., B-410179 et al., 2014 WL 6199127,
at *6 n.10 (Comp. Gen. Nov. 12, 2014) (“[T]he holding in Delex has been
superceded by the passage of section 1331 of the Small Business Jobs Act . . . .”). For
further discussion of this strange outcome, see Steven Koprince, Task Orders: Small
Business Set-Asides Not Required, Says GAO, SMALLGOVCON (Nov. 25, 2014),
http://smallgovcon.com/gaobidprotests/task-orders-small-business-set-asides-not
-required-says-gao/.
77. Aldevra, B-405271 et al., 2011 WL 4826148, at *1 (Comp. Gen. Oct. 11,
2011).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
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prepared with a whole new set of arguments that the GAO rejected
in turn.
First, the VA asserted that it had “discretion to determine
whether to meet its requirements through the FSS before procuring
from other sources—such as SDVOSBs or VOSBs.”81 Second, the VA
claimed that FAR § 8.404(a) explicitly provided that FAR Part 19 was
inapplicable to FSS acquisitions, including FAR subpart 19.14, which
was “the only subpart of FAR part 19 that address[ed] set-asides for
SDVOSBs.”82 Again, the GAO disagreed.83
On the first point, the GAO concluded that there was no actual
basis in the various statutes that provided the VA with discretion of
the type it had asserted.84 In fact, the plain language was
“unequivocal” that it did not have such discretion.85 On the second
point, the GAO reminded the VA that FAR subpart 19.14 was meant
to implement the statutory requirements of the Veterans Benefit Act
of 2003.86 FAR subpart 19.14 applies government-wide, whereas the
Veterans Act of 2006 “applies only to VA procurements.”87 While the
language of the Veterans Benefit Act of 2003 was permissive with
regard to applying the Rule of Two,88 the 2006 Veterans Act had

81. Id. at *2.
82. Id. at *3.
83. Id. at *3–6.
84. Id. at *2.
85. Id.
We see nothing in the VA Act or the [Veterans Administration
Acquisition Regulation] that provides the agency with discretion to
conduct a procurement under FSS procedures without first determining
whether the acquisition should be set aside for SDVOSBs. The provisions
of both the VA Act and the VAAR are unequivocal; the VA “shall” award
contracts on the basis of competition restricted to SDVOSBs where there
is a reasonable expectation that two or more SDVOSBs will submit offers
and award can be made at a fair and reasonable price.
Id.
86. Id. at *5; see FAR § 19.1402.
87. Aldevra, 2011 WL 4826148, at *3; see 38 U.S.C. §§ 8127–28 (2006); Angelica
Textile Servs., Inc. v. United States, 95 Fed. Cl. 208, 222 (2010).
88. Aldevra, 2011 WL 4826148, at *4 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 657f(b) (2006)) (“In
accordance with this section, a contracting officer may award contracts on the basis
of competition restricted to small business concerns owned and controlled by
service-disabled veterans if the contracting officer has a reasonable expectation that
not less than 2 small business concerns owned and controlled by service-disabled
veterans will submit offers and that the award can be made at a fair market price.”
(emphasis added)).
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mandatory language that required the VA to apply the Rule of Two.89
Therefore, the VA’s argument on this point was invalid, because the
FAR language exempting the FSS did not apply to the statute at issue
in the protest.90
Consistent with this reasoning, the GAO recommended that the
VA cancel the solicitations in question, conduct the proper market
research analysis as required by the Rule of Two, and resolicit the
procurements consistent with that analysis.91 The VA refused to
follow this recommendation.92 It was this exact behavior by the VA,
of refusing to accept the recommendations of the GAO, which led
to the facts in Kingdomware now explored in detail.
III. THE KINGDOMWARE TECHNOLOGIES, INC. V. UNITED STATES
DECISION
A.

Facts and Procedure

In early 2012, the VA initiated procurement activity in order to
install an Emergency Notification Service at four of its medical
centers.93 To that end, the VA solicited a price quotation from a
nonveteran-owned business through the FSS.94 Finding the price
favorable, the VA accepted the terms and entered into an agreement
with that business.95 Kingdomware challenged the award, and it had
standing as a company owned by an Army veteran who was
permanently disabled by an injury he sustained while serving in
Operation Desert Storm.96

89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id.
Id.
See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-162SP, GAO BID PROTEST
ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012 (2012),
http://www.gao.gov/assets/650/649957.pdf.
93. Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1969, 1974 (2016).
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1974–75.
96. Amy Howe, Opinion Analysis: Unanimous Court Hands Victory to Veterans in
Contracting
Dispute,
SCOTUSBLOG
(June
16,
2016
3:27
PM),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/06/opinion-analysis-unanimous-court-hands
-victory-to-veterans-in-contracting-dispute/.
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The GAO Bid Protest

In this challenge, argued in front of the GAO, Kingdomware
contended, as Aldevra had before it,97 that the VA was barred from
awarding the procurement until it had conducted market research
into the ability of SDVOSBs to perform the contract as required by
§ 8127’s Rule of Two.98 The GAO’s nonbinding determination was
“that the [VA’s] failure to employ the Rule of Two was unlawful,”
and the agency therefore “recommended that the [VA] conduct
market research to determine whether there were two veteranowned businesses that could fulfill the procurement.”99 The VA
declined to follow the GAO’s ruling,100 reiterating its position that
the Rule of Two did not apply to FSS procurements.101
2.

The Federal Court of Claims Ruling

With no further recourse to be had through the GAO,
Kingdomware filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims, seeking

97. See Aldevra, B-406205, 2012 WL 860813, at *1 (Comp. Gen. Mar. 14, 2012).
98. Kingdomware Techs., B-406507, 2012 WL 1942256 (Comp. Gen. May 30,
2012).
99. Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1969, 1975 (2016).
Consistent with our decision in Aldevra . . . we conclude that the VA Act
required the agency to consider whether this acquisition should have
been set aside for SDVOSB (or VOSB) concerns. Further, on the record
presented, it appears that such set-aside should have occurred.
Accordingly, we sustain Kingdomware’s protest.
Kingdomware., 2012 WL 1942256, at *2.
100. “GAO decisions are not binding authority, but may be ‘instructive in the
area of bid protests.’” Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 107 Fed. Cl. 226,
244 n.2 (2012) (citing Centech Grp., Inc. v. United States, 554 F.3d 1029, 1038 n.4
(Fed. Cir. 2009)), aff’d, 754 F.3d 923 (Fed. Cir. 2014), rev’d and remanded, 136 S. Ct.
1969.
The Competition in Contracting Act (“CICA”) grants the Comptroller
General of GAO authority in a bid protest (1) to determine whether a
contracting agency’s solicitation or award of contract is in violation of a
procurement statute or regulation, and (2) to recommend that the
agency take corrective action if the agency did not comply with the
statute or regulation.
Jacobs Tech. Inc. v. United States, 100 Fed. Cl. 186, 196 n.21 (2011) (citing 31 U.S.C.
§ 3554(b)(1)).
101. Kingdomware, 2012 WL 1942256, at *2; see Aldevra, 2012 WL 860813, at *2.
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declaratory and injunctive relief.102 Instead, relying on the statutory
interpretation framework established in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,103 the Court of Federal Claims
granted summary judgment to the VA.104
Using the Chevron framework, the Court of Federal Claims first
found ambiguity in § 8127(d).105 Moving to the second step in the
Chevron analysis, the court then declared that the VA’s interpretation
(that the Veterans Act did not apply to the FSS) was reasonable and
worthy of deference.106 The court made its decision at least in part
due to the VA’s consistent interpretation, which “reflects a uniform
approach on the part of the agency.”107 Additionally, the court held
that the VA’s interpretation was “not directly in conflict with the Act
. . . , which [is] silent on the role of the FSS in meeting the goals set
by the Secretary,” or “with the legislative history of the Act, which
expresses the intent that VA retain ‘options’ to award contracts to
SDVOSBs and VOSBs.”108 The court affirmed “that VA would
‘exercise reasonable judgment’ in meeting the Act’s set-aside goals
alongside VA’s other small business goal obligations.”109 Finally, the

102. Kingdomware, 136 S. Ct. at 1975.
103. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue. If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end
of the matter. . . . If, however, the court determines Congress has not
directly addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not
simply impose its own construction on the statute, as would be necessary
in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute
is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for
the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.
Id. at 842–43.
104. Kingdomware, 107 Fed. Cl. at 244.
105. Id. at 241 (“[T]he goal-setting nature of the statute clouds the clarity
plaintiff would attribute to the phrase ‘shall award’ in subsection (d) of the Act, and
renders the Act ambiguous as to its application to other procurement vehicles, such
as the FSS.”).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 243–44 (citing United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234
(2001)).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 244 (describing the contracting guidelines that the legislation
provides for the VA).
VA would be allowed to award non-competitive contracts to small
businesses owned and controlled by veterans when the amount of the

2017]

KINGDOMWARE TECHNOLOGIES, INC. V. UNITED STATES 685

court concluded, “VA’s interpretation is consistent with the
traditional relationship between set-asides and the FSS found in the
FAR . . . .”110
3.

The Federal Circuit Majority Opinion

Kingdomware then appealed to the Federal Circuit, which in
turn affirmed the lower court’s ruling by a divided panel.111 The
majority agreed with the lower court that the proper analysis was to
follow the two-step framework of Chevron regarding statutory
interpretation.112 This time, however, the review ended at the first
step; the court held that Congress was not silent.113 In fact, it did
speak directly to the question, and since it perceived “no ambiguity
in § 8127,” that was, according to Chevron, “the end of the matter, for
the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”114
The majority was not persuaded by Kingdomware’s argument
that the statutory change in language from “may” to “shall” between
the 2003 and 2006 versions of § 8127(d) of the Veterans Act
implicated “the canon of construction that a change in legislative
language generally gives rise to a presumption that Congress

contract is below the simplified acquisition threshold as defined in
section 4 of the Office of Federal Procurement Policy Act (41 U.S.C. s
403). Further, contracting officers would be allowed, but not required,
to award sole source contracts to small businesses owned and controlled
by veterans to meet the annual goal set by the Secretary for contracts
above the simplified acquisition threshold but below $5,000,000.
Contracting officers would retain the option to restrict competition to small
businesses owned and controlled by veterans if the contracting officer has an
expectation that two or more such businesses owned by veterans will
submit offers for the contract including all contracts exceeding
$5,000,000.
Id. at 240 (quoting 152 CONG. REC. S11609, S11615 (daily ed. Dec. 8, 2006) (Joint
Explanatory Statement as read into the record)).
110. Id. at 244.
111. Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 754 F.3d 923, 934 (Fed. Cir.
2014), rev’d and remanded, 136 S. Ct. 1969 (2016).
112. See id. at 930 (“Here, since there are no factual or mixed factual and legal
issues, and the only question is one of statutory construction, we apply the Chevron
standard.”).
113. See id. at 931.
114. Id. (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842–43 (1984)).

686

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:3

intended to change the meaning of the law.”115 In fact, the panel
reasoned, Kingdomware was unreasonable in its interpretation of
the Act.116 On the one hand it was assigning “dispositive weight to
the command term ‘shall,’” but on the other it was ignoring the
“additional statutory language stating that this mandate [was] ‘for
purposes of meeting the goals under subsection (a).’”117 After all,
the panel reasoned, Congress had enacted the statute “out of
frustration with the failure of agencies Government-wide to achieve
the aspirational goals of 3% for SDVOSBs.”118 Since interpreting
these prefatory words as mere “surplusage” would violate “a bedrock
principle of statutory interpretation” and would lead to illogical
outcomes, the panel reasoned that the words must be given
meaning.119 If the panel ruled against the VA it would be requiring
the agency “to conduct a Rule of Two analysis for every contract
irrespective of the goals set under subsection (a),” making the goal
provision itself “superfluous.”120
The panel acknowledged the VA’s argument that interpreting
the statutory language as mandatory would not only create
inefficiencies for the agency, but also undermine the purpose of the
Act by preventing the VA from meeting its goals with regard to other
small businesses—an outcome apparently conflicting with the
legislators’ anticipated outcome.121 Therefore, the panel held that
the VA “need not perform a VOSB Rule of Two analysis for every
contract, as long as the goals set under subsection (a) are met.”122
Despite the Federal Circuit’s incorrect application of the canons
of statutory interpretation, the reasoning was not completely off
base. As the panel predicted, the VA must now grapple with the very

115. Id. at 931–34.
116. Id. at 933.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 934.
119. Id. at 933 (citing Qi-Zhuo v. Meissner, 70 F.3d 136, 139 (D.C. Cir. 1995)).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 934 (“Congress anticipated that with the contracting tools provided
in § 8127, the VA would be able to ‘meet, if not exceed’ its contracting goals, . . .
while at the same time fulfilling the goals it has set for other small business entities.”
(citation omitted)). “The goals for veteran and service-disabled veteran owned
businesses are not in any way intended to prevent attainment of other set-aside
goals.” Id. (quoting 152 CONG. REC. S11609–03, S11616).
122. Id.
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real outcomes resulting from the Supreme Court’s ruling in
Kingdomware.123
4.

The Federal Circuit Dissent

Judge Reyna, the lone dissent throughout the entire legal
progression of Kingdomware, argued for a much stricter textual
analysis than that of the Federal Circuit majority.124 Rather than
trying to ascertain the intent of Congress, or “choosing our preferred
interpretation from among a range of potentially plausible, but likely
inaccurate, interpretations of a statute,” Judge Reyna argued that the
court should find in favor of Kingdomware using a plain language
approach.125 In fact, Judge Reyna posited, “[t]he statutory provision
at issue could not be clearer. It provides that contracting officers
‘shall award contracts’ on the basis of restricted competition
whenever the contracting officer has a reasonable expectation that
the Rule of Two will be satisfied.”126
Judge Reyna proceeded to scold the majority for acting as policy
maker and, in doing so, losing sight of its “duty to enforce the proper
interpretation of the statute regardless of [their] policy views.”127 As
Kingdomware had unsuccessfully argued, the use of “shall award” in
§ 8127(d) is mandatory language when compared to the
discretionary language of “may use” and “may award” present in
§§ 8127(b) and (c).128 Judge Reyna found that “when the same
statute uses both ‘may’ and ‘shall,’ the normal inference is that each
is used in its usual sense and that the former is permissive, the latter
mandatory.”129
Judge Reyna then took note of the majority’s total disregard for
the GAO’s construction of the statute and its numerous
recommendations that the VA comply with § 8127(d).130 He went on

123. See infra Sections IV.A.3–4.
124. Kingdomware, 754 F.3d at 934–35 (Reyna, J., dissenting).
125. Id. (“The plain language of the 2006 Veterans Act unambiguously requires
VA contracting officers to conduct a Rule of Two analysis in every acquisition and
does not exempt task or delivery orders under the [FSS].”).
126. Id. at 935.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 936 (citing Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U.S. 482, 485 (1947); Ky., Educ.
Cabinet, Dep’t for the Blind v. United States, 424 F.3d 1222, 1227 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
130. Kingdomware, 754 F.3d at 936; see U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra
note 92, at 5.
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to explain how the words that served as the foundation for the
majority’s arguments—”for purposes of meeting the goals under
subsection (a)”—are prefatory in nature, and it was therefore
inappropriate to construe them as having any limiting effect on the
operative clause.131 Additionally, he contended that the majority’s
fear that a mandatory Rule of Two provision would “obviate the goalsetting provision” was misguided since the goals are merely
“aspirations, not destinations.”132 These arguments are logically
sound and represent a win for statutory interpretation.133
B.

Justice Thomas’s Opinion

Justice Thomas expressed his approval for Reyna’s dissent by
echoing his textual arguments. In a unanimous 8-0 opinion, the
Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings
consistent with that result.134 In a surprisingly non-contentious
ruling, given the lower court rulings and the decade long battle
between the VA and disadvantaged concerns both in court and in
front of the GAO, Justice Thomas, speaking for the entire Court,
held “that § 8127(d) unambiguously requires the [VA] to use the
Rule of Two before contracting under the competitive
procedures.”135
The Court borrowed many of Judge Reyna’s arguments in his
lower court dissent to explain its reasoning. First, the Court agreed
with the Federal Circuit panel’s overall finding that § 8127(d) is
unambiguous.136 However, that is where the two opinions diverge.
The Court adopted a narrow interpretation of the text, reiterating
Judge Reyna’s position that “Congress’ use of the word ‘shall’
demonstrates that § 8127(d) mandates the use of the Rule of Two in
all contracting before using competitive procedures. Unlike the
word ‘may,’ which implies discretion, the word ‘shall’ usually
connotes a requirement.”137 This refreshingly straightforward

131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Kingdomware, 754 F.3d at 936–38.
Id. at 938, 940.
See infra Section IV.A.1.
Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1969, 1979 (2016).
Id. at 1976.
Id.
Id. at 1977.
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interpretation of the plain meaning of the statutory provision makes
the lower court’s reasoning look like it was grasping at straws.
Following this logic, Justice Thomas went on to point out
another flaw in the Federal Circuit panel’s analysis. While the lower
court focused on the prefatory language, “[f]or the purpose of
meeting the goals under [§ 8127(a)],” it failed to address the
presence of the exact same phrase in the two subparts that utilize the
permissive “may.”138 Justice Thomas illustrated that “[i]f the Federal
Circuit’s understanding of § 8127(d)’s prefatory clause were correct,
then §§ 8127(b) and (c), which also contain [the same clause],
would cease to apply once the [VA] meets the Secretary’s goal, and
the [VA] would be required to return to competitive bidding.”139
This type of disparate result could not be allowed to stand.
The Court also addressed the argument of the lower court and
the VA that the Court should defer to the agency based on the
framework in Chevron.140 This argument fails because Chevron’s
deference is only required when a statute is ambiguous, which this
one is not.141 In this way, the Court circumvented the Chevron
framework and concluded that the VA was not deserving of judicial
deference in this case.
In ruling that the statute must be applied based on its plain
meaning, as amended by the legislature, rather than based on some
hypothetical legislative intent that must be ascertained through
extensive investigation and assumptions, the Court came to the
correct legal conclusion. This sensible reading of the statute is truly
a win for statutory interpretation, and collaterally for VOSBs as well,
but the consequences of making the right decision will perhaps be
much more problematic than the Court would like to admit.142
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF KINGDOMWARE AND AFFIRMATIVE SOLUTIONS
To understand the consequences of Kingdomware, it is helpful to
tally the winners and losers. While the Supreme Court was correct in
its interpretation of the relevant statutes and its application of
controlling legal precedent, representing a huge win for veterans, its
ruling in Kingdomware will have negative consequences far beyond
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id.
Id. at 1978.
Id. at 1979.
Id. at 1978.
See infra Section IV.B.1.
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the surface-level victory for one disadvantaged concern. This Note
will explain how the Court’s mandate creates chaos and
inefficiencies across governmental agencies, which must now
scramble to adjust their own practices or face litigation. This
decision will have potentially devastating effects on nonveteran
disadvantaged concerns that stand to lose government contracts as a
result. In conclusion, this Note briefly examines the legislative intent
behind the Veteran’s Act and proposes a statutory change consistent
with that intent that could solve some of the issues outlined.
A.

The Winners and Losers of Kingdomware
1.

A Win for Statutory Interpretation

With the passing of the late Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas is now
the leading originalist on the Supreme Court and has proven himself
to be something of a textual crusader during his twenty-five years on
the bench.143 In fact, Justice Thomas may be the Supreme Court
Justice who most often relies on the canons of statutory construction
in his decisions.144 Therefore, it is certainly fitting that Justice
Thomas authored the majority opinion in Kingdomware—a clear win
for the canons.
In Kingdomware, Justice Thomas stayed true to his prior rulings
when he relied on the unambiguous plain meaning of § 8127’s
text.145 Although “[c]anons of construction need not be

143. See Judge H. Brent McKnight, The Emerging Contours of Justice Thomas’s
Textualism, 12 REGENT U. L. REV. 365, 365–66 (2000); Hon. David B. Sentelle,
Remarks—Justice Thomas, the Person, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 482, 490–91 (2009); Ralph
Rossum, Understanding Clarence Thomas: The Jurisprudence of Constitutional Restoration,
L. & LIBERTY (Apr. 1, 2014), http://www.libertylawsite.org/liberty-forum
/understanding-clarence-thomas-the-jurisprudence-of-constitutional-restoration/.
144. See James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive
Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 45–46 (2005).
145. Compare Kingdomware, 136 S. Ct. at 1976–77, with Conn. Nat. Bank v.
Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992) (“[C]anons of construction are no more than
rules of thumb that help courts determine the meaning of legislation, and in
interpreting a statute a court should always turn first to one, cardinal canon before
all others. We have stated time and again that courts must presume that a legislature
says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there. When the
words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last: ‘judicial
inquiry is complete.’” (Thomas, J., writing for the majority) (citations omitted)).
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conclusive,”146 the Court has stated that the plain meaning of a
statute “necessarily contains the best evidence of Congress’ . . .
intent.”147 Looking no further than the plain meaning of § 8127’s
text is consistent with the Court’s precedent and reinforces
important principles of statutory interpretation.
In focusing on the statutory language, the Court avoided falling
into the same trap as the lower courts in Kingdomware.148 Those
courts expended significant energy rummaging about in
congressional testimony in search of other potential or intended
meanings that were ultimately incorrect.149
2.

A Win for Veterans

The mandate in Kingdomware is an indisputable win for
SDVOSBs and VOSBs across America.150 As a direct result of the
Court’s ruling, VOSBs stand to receive an enormous volume of new
VA contracts—opportunities that will reap extreme monetary
benefits.151 If other government agencies follow suit by mandating
146. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 115 (2001).
147. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 664 (1993).
148. See supra notes 97–100 and accompanying text.
149. See Brief of Members of Congress as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner
at 10–11, Kingdomware, 136 S. Ct. 1969 (No. 14-916), 2015 WL 5026167 (“The VA
and the Federal Circuit have both cited to a single line in the legislative history that
they claim shows that the change from ‘may’ to ‘shall’ was intended to refer to the
VA’s goals, not the Veterans Rule of Two analysis . . . . However, that reference to
‘goals’ has been taken out of context.”).
150. A mere perusal of the amicus curiae briefs filed in support of Kingdomware
show that veterans organizations across the spectrum view the Court’s holding to be
a victory for veterans. See, e.g., Brief for the Am. Legion as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, Kingdomware, 136 S. Ct. 1969 (No. 14-916), 2015 WL 5026168; Brief for
Ir. and Afg. Veterans of Am. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Kingdomware,
136 S. Ct. 1969 (No. 14-916), 2015 WL 5026170; Brief of Amici Curiae Nat’l Veteran
Small Bus. Coal. et al. in Support of Petitioner, Kingdomware, 136 S. Ct. 1969 (No.
14-916), 2015 WL 5026169; Brief of Amici Curiae Paralyzed Veterans of Am., Viet.
Veterans Ass’n, The Military Officers Ass’n of Am. & The Nat’l Veterans Legal Servs.
Program in Support of Petitioner, Kingdomware, 136 S. Ct. 1969 (No. 14-916), 2015
WL 5093217.
151. As recently as 2015, the “Total Small Business Eligible Dollars” for the VA
was over $20 billion. Prior to the decision in Kingdomware, VOSBs accounted for
18.6% of this total, VOSBs accounted for 16.8%, small disadvantaged businesses
accounted for 7.4%, WOSBs accounted for nearly 3%, HUBZone businesses
accounted for 1.6%, and 8(a) businesses accounted for .2%, leaving the lion’s share
for other small businesses. Small Business Goaling Report, Fiscal Year: 2015, FED.
PROCUREMENT DATA SYS.—NEXT GENERATION, https://www.fpds.gov/downloads
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Rule of Two analysis for all of their procurement contracts, either
voluntarily or through litigation, as some are proposing,152 VOSBs
could see their businesses grow exponentially.153 In light of the newly
mandated priority of VOSBs in VA procurement, there is also a push
for expanded efforts to train and develop VOSBs in order to meet
the huge business demands that will inevitably follow the Court’s
decision—an added benefit for small businesses that have previously
struggled to attain large contracts due to their lack of training.154
This type of training could go a long way towards dispelling the view
held by some of the VA’s contracting officers that a small business is
less capable than a larger business of completing a contract to the
VA’s satisfaction, a belief that has led some of these officers to favor
large contractors over smaller ones.155 Finally, the Kingdomware
/top_requests/FPDSNG_SB_Goaling_FY_2015.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2017).
Post-Kingdomware, VOSBs and SDVOSBs stand to receive a large portion of the
nearly $13 billion in VA contracts that are currently awarded to other parties. Id.
152. See Hearing, supra note 8 (statement of Michael Phipps, Managing Director,
The Millennium Group Int’l LLC, at 1) (“The case also validated the Congressional
practice of enhanced agency-specific Service Disabled Veteran Owned Small
Business (SDVOSB) set-aside goal measures to supplement the Small Business Act.
This shows other agencies the importance of implementing internal policies where
buyers cannot stop looking for SDVOSB’s even after they meet their SDVOSB goals.
The Committee should direct all agencies to implement such policies.”).
153. Total small business eligible dollars across government agencies topped
$352 billion in 2015. See Small Business Goaling Report, Fiscal Year: 2015, supra note
151.
154. See Hearing, supra note 8 (statement of Michael Phipps, Managing Director,
The Millennium Group Int’l LLC, at 3–6) (“[T]he Senate Small Business
Committee should consider the research conducted by Professor Max Kidalov and
his co-author Jennifer Lee . . . . The research highlights the need to create a growth
pathway from low-dollar simplified acquisitions to more complex buys. The research
also demonstrates that contracting officers have trouble deciding on when to use
discretionary SDVOSB set-asides. For this reason, the research recommends a
Business Development Program for SDVOSB’s, agency-specific or governmentwide.” (citing MAX V. KIDALOV & JENNIFER L. LEE, AN OPEN DOOR AND A LEG UP:
INCREASING SERVICE-DISABLED VETERAN-OWNED SMALL BUSINESS PARTICIPATION IN
DEFENSE, NAVY, AND MARINE CORPS CONTRACTING THROUGH SIMPLIFIED ACQUISITIONS
(2015), http://calhoun.nps.edu/bitstream/handle/10945/47473/NPS-GSBPP-15
-004.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y)).
155. See Hearing, supra note 8 (statement of Thomas J. Leney, Executive
Director, Department of Veterans Affairs Office of Small and Disadvantaged
Business Utilization, at 2) (“In addition, contracting officers and their program
office customers need to have confidence that VOSBs can execute the contracts
awarded to them. VA wants our contractors to be successful without unnecessary
delays, higher costs, and added risks to VA’s mission. This is one reason why some
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mandate forces the VA to at last embrace its duty to put “veterans
first,” as Congress intended.156
These outcomes are overwhelmingly positive for VOSBs, and
they support the somewhat obvious conclusion that veterans are the
biggest winners in Kingdomware. On the other hand, not all of the
results flowing from the Court’s ruling in Kingdomware are positive.
It stands to reason that if there are winners, then there must be losers
as well, and this case is no different.
3.

A Loss for Efficiency

Governmental inefficiency is one negative consequence of the
Court’s mandate in Kingdomware. Despite claims to the contrary by
veterans,157 interested parties,158 and the Court,159 the Kingdomware
decision will undoubtedly result in inefficiencies and confusion for

personnel may perceive large business contractors as a safer choice, because they
believe large firms’ internal quality assurance programs will mitigate these risks. In
this view, small businesses may look like a riskier choice.”).
156. See Brief of Members of Congress as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
supra note 149, at 1 (“[T]he House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs and . . . the
Subcommittee on Economic Opportunity . . . spearheaded the effort to ensure that
veteran-owned small businesses would be first in line to compete for government
contracts.” (emphasis added)).
157. See Hearing, supra note 8 (statement of LaTonya Barton, Employee,
Business Operations, Kingdomware Technologies, Inc., at 3) (“By working with
veterans, the VA can achieve the important objectives of the law while still
maintaining an efficient procurement process. For example, the VA can already
streamline the process for smaller contracts through existing authority to make sole
source or noncompetitive awards.”).
158. See Brief of Amici Curiae Nat’l Veteran Small Bus. Coal. et al. in Support of
Petitioner, supra note 150, at 21 (“Respecting Congress’s choice and upholding the
statutory rights of veterans does not mean that VA purchasing will grind to a halt
. . . .”).
159. See Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1969, 1978–79
(2016) (“The Department maintains that FSS orders are only for simplified
acquisitions, and that using the Rule of Two for these purchases will hamper
mundane purchases . . . . But . . . the Department may continue to purchase items
that cost less than the simplified acquisition threshold (currently $150,000) through
the FSS, if the Department procures them from a veteran-owned small business.”
(citations omitted)).
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the VA, as well as other government agencies,160 which must
scramble to implement the newly minted mandate.161
To its credit, the VA has seemingly taken this added burden in
stride,162 perhaps cognizant of the negative perception of its
stubborn refusal to accept the ultimately correct recommendations
of the GAO163 or perhaps resigned to the binding judgment of the
highest Court in the land.164 Regardless of its motivation, the VA and
other agencies are forced to accept the Court’s ruling and must now
forge ahead the best they can. To that end, the VA has already issued
an internal policy memo apprising its employees of the changes that
are to flow from the Kingdomware ruling and the possible effects the
mandate will have on daily operations.165
Despite these changes, there are still more administrative issues
that the Court did not specifically address in its decision. The most
160. See Hearing, supra note 8 (statement of A. John Shoraka, Associate
Administrator, Office of Government Contracting and Business Development, at 4)
(“Since the Kingdomware decision is silent on the construction of the Small Business
Act, it is unclear what impact the ruling has beyond VA and its use of the VA statute.
SBA will be conferring with the Department of Justice, the SBPAC, GSA (as
managers of the Federal Supply Schedules), the Federal Acquisition Regulatory
Council, and others to discuss if any changes to regulations are needed.”).
161. Id. (statement of Thomas J. Leney, Executive Director, Department of
Veterans Affairs Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization, at 1)
(“[W]e have already taken action to address the Court’s recent decision. For
example, we have modified VA’s Procurement Review Policy, issued by my office, to
require the review of all procurements not set aside for VOSBs. We have also
directed VA’s contracting officers to review all active procurements to determine
whether VOSBs were appropriately considered in the market research.”).
162. See id. at 1–2. (“VA will comply immediately with the Court’s decision . . . .
[T]he Court’s decision is an opportunity for VA to improve our best practices.”).
163. See id. (statement of LaTonya Barton, Employee, Business Operations,
Kingdomware Technologies, Inc., at 3) (“It is time for the VA to stop looking for
loopholes and to redirect that energy into making the mandate work.”).
164. See id. (statement of Thomas J. Leney, Executive Director, Department of
Veterans Affairs Office of Small and Disadvantaged Business Utilization, at 1)
(“While VA’s previous policy was found to be consistent with the law by two
subordinate Federal courts, Kingdomware represents a correction of our
understanding of the Veterans First mandate.”).
165. See U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, VA’S APPROACH TO VETERANS FIRST
CONTRACTING POST-KINGDOMWARE (Sept. 19, 2016), http://www.va.gov/osdbu
/docs/vets-first-post-kingdomware-briefing-09-19-2016-v2.pdf (arguing that impacts
of the Kingdomware decision include the administrative burden from updating
policies, training personnel, and addressing a backlog of requests due to increased
work load; an increase in the amount of verification applications; and increased
significance of the vendor information pages).
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obvious of these issues is the Court’s lack of direction as to what kind
of market analysis the VA is required to perform under the Rule of
Two.166 Based on its track record when it comes to discretionary
decisions, the VA is not positioned to make this type of
determination on its own. Therefore, the sole avenues for resolving
this lack of direction are litigation or a legislative action. Legislative
action is almost certainly the less contentious and more cost-effective
resolution. In fact, this Note will later offer a proposed legislative
action that will include a directive on this topic.167
The VA has been fighting this mandate for nearly ten years.
Based on the potential administrative burdens outlined in this
section, it will continue to be a wrench in the gears of an already
malfunctioning government machine.168
4.

A Loss for Equity

Another negative consequence of the Court’s decision in
Kingdomware is the required prioritization of veteran interests over
those of every other disadvantaged concern. Since the VA must now
consider VOSBs in virtually all procurement situations, it is likely that
the increase in VOSB contracts will mean few, if any, contracts will
be awarded to other disadvantaged concerns, such as WOSBs and
HUBZone contractors.169 It is a shame that beneficial change for
America’s veterans comes at the expense of several other historically
disadvantaged groups of business owners, such as women and racial
minorities. Ironically, supporters of Kingdomware have presented
arguments in favor of a mandated priority for VOSBs, while
simultaneously failing to see that the same arguments are now true
of other disadvantaged concerns—some with even less market
share.170

166. See Hearing, supra note 8 (statement of Jonathan T. Williams, Partner,
PilieroMazza PLLC, at 3) (“The Supreme Court explicitly declined to address how
extensive the VA’s market research must be to satisfy its obligations under the Vets
First mandate. Does the VA need to look only at FSS contract holders to determine
if the Rule of Two is satisfied? Or, does the VA need to look outside FSS contract
holders? The Supreme Court did not say, so Congress should step in with legislation
to answer this question.”).
167. See infra Section IV.B.2.
168. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
169. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
170. See Hearing, supra note 8 (statement of LaTonya Barton, Employee,
Business Operations, Kingdomware Technologies, Inc., at 2) (“[B]illions of dollars

696

MITCHELL HAMLINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43:3

Taking food out of the mouth of one disadvantaged concern to
feed another does not seem equitable in the least, but that is the
potential result of Kingdomware. Adding insult to injury, research
shows that the new financial boon for VOSBs may not be shared
equitably among all veteran contractors, meaning that some small
nonveteran concerns will likely lose contracts to large repeat
players.171 This outcome undermines the very purpose of § 8127,
which is to encourage veterans and other disadvantaged concerns to
pursue entrepreneurial and innovative endeavors in the form of
small business government contracting.
It is, however, possible to avoid some of these negative
consequences of the Court’s decision in Kingdomware while
simultaneously promoting the positive ones. This Note will now
propose two legislative actions that aim to accomplish just that.
B.

Proposed Legislative Action
1.

Reforms for Procurements Going Forward

One of the negative consequences of Kingdomware is the
potential for inefficiencies and confusion between government
agencies that must now try to understand the Court’s ruling as it
applies to them while also grappling with increased workloads
created by newly mandated market analysis and extra training to
ensure compliance with the changes.172
Specifically, the VA will now face a huge influx of new
applications to its vendor programs that must be processed, in
addition to market research analysis that must be completed for each
and every procurement in order to satisfy the Rule of Two.173
have been steered away from veterans trying to establish and grow their businesses
and feed their families. Many veterans are now out of business, some even having
contemplated suicide, because there were no opportunities to contract with the
VA.”).
171. See Hearing, supra note 8 (statement of Michael Phipps, Managing Director,
The Millennium Group Int’l LLC, at 4) (“The research conclusively demonstrates
that the current SDVOSB Program supports a dwindling number of established
firms. This is because the SDVOSB Program as currently designed is not effectively
aligned to increase broad-based participation of SDVOSB firms as contractors.”);
KIDALOV & LEE, supra note 154, at 90 (“The alumni population of the SDVOSB
Program . . . receiving New Awards has been dwindling over the recent years.”).
172. See supra Section IV.A.3.
173. See Hearing, supra note 8 (statement of Michael Phipps, Managing Director,
The Millennium Group Int’l LLC, at 4–5, 7).
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Although it is not uncommon for new legislation or Supreme Court
rulings to create additional work for government agencies, rarely are
those agencies already struggling to meet their existing duties as is
the case with the VA. It is therefore unsurprising that the agency
cited inefficiency concerns while it argued so vehemently against the
imposition of Rule of Two analysis on FSS orders.174
Other agencies, such as the SBA, are also concerned about what
the Court’s mandate means for them.175 SBA is, however, not the
only agency that should be concerned. As shown in Delex Systems,176
numerous government agencies deal in one way or another with
contract set-asides and the Rule of Two. These agencies include the
Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, the GSA, and
NASA, amongst others.177
To simplify the procurement process for government agencies
and avoid the costly litigation that is likely to come if nothing is done
soon,178 this Note proposes that Congress enact legislation to
consolidate the FSS programs run by the VA and SBA. This action
should resolve several issues that practitioners are witnessing as a
result of the current inconsistencies between the two programs.179
174. Brief for the United States, supra note 9, at 15 (“Petitioner’s interpretation
of Section 8127 would also produce significant waste and inefficiency.”).
175. See Hearing, supra note 8 (statement of A. John Shoraka, Associate
Administrator, Office of Government Contracting and Business Development, at 4).
176. See supra Section II.E.1.
177. See Small Business Goaling Report, Fiscal Year: 2015, supra note 151.
178. See Damien C. Specht & Rachael K. Plymale, Feature Comment:
Kingdomware: Broader than SCOTUS Intended?, 58 No. 26 GOV’T CONTRACTOR 1, 4
(“Whether the decision will lead to expansion of small business set-asides under
GSA’s FSS is yet to be seen, but it has already been the topic of congressional
hearings, and may soon be the topic of litigation.”).
179. See Hearing, supra note 8 (statement of Jonathan T. Williams, Partner,
PilieroMazza PLLC, at 3) (“The Kingdomware ruling is also another opportunity to
ponder the wisdom of having two federal government procurement programs for
VOSBs. The two programs, one run by the VA and the other by the SBA, are very
similar but are not identical. Inconsistencies between the two programs have led to
confusion and inefficiencies for the veteran contracting community and federal
agencies. As an example, we represented one VOSB that was proposed for
debarment by SBA because of the company’s ownership structure, which did not
comply with the SBA’s VOSB rules but did satisfy the VA’s VOSB rules. Additionally,
VOSBs have been forced to file bid protests with the GAO because of procuring
officials who have applied the VA’s verification requirements to non-VA
procurements. Contracting officers have sent SDVOSB protests on a non-VA
contract to the VA, instead of the SBA. VA contracting officers have failed to forward
size protests to the SBA, even though the SBA is the agency exclusively authorized
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This Note also proposes that Congress ensure agency
compliance with its intent to put veterans first by issuing guidance to
all the involved agencies, explaining how Kingdomware applies to
them and whether or not the Rule of Two is mandatory for that
agency.180 If significant administrative burdens will be created due to
these new mandates, then Congress should supply the agencies with
the resources necessary to enact the procedures. Veterans will not
benefit if granting them first priority for government contracts only
mires the contracting agencies in administrative backlog, especially
when the VA is already dealing with vast inefficiencies in the
procurement process.181 These straightforward adjustments to the
current contracting regime should result in a more efficient
government and one that better serves its veterans.
2.

Changes to 38 U.S.C. § 8127

Besides making a sweeping change to synchronize procurement
practices across agencies, Congress could improve the Rule of Two
provision, contained within § 8127(d), that was at issue in
Kingdomware. Although the Court made clear that the Rule of Two
must be applied by the VA in all its procurement processes, as
previously discussed, that ruling will have several unsavory
consequences182 that could be avoided through a legislative action.

to decide size status. And VOSBs that participate in SBA’s VOSB program may seek
review of eligibility determinations before an administrative law judge at SBA’s
Office of Hearings and Appeals, but VOSBs participating in the VA’s program
cannot. There are other differences between the programs, all of which
unnecessarily add to the veteran’s compliance burden and complicate the mission
of increasing federal spending on VOSBs.”).
180. This Note finds no issue with Congress choosing to hold some agencies,
such as the VA, to a different standard with regard to contract set-asides for specific
disadvantaged concerns. However, if Congress has designs as to which agencies
should be required to conduct Rule of Two analysis, this intent must be made
explicitly clear, especially in statutory language, to avoid potential inefficiency or
litigation.
181. Press Release, Representative Mike Coffman, Coffman Legislation
Streamlines, Modernizes VA Procurement Process (Jun. 15, 2016),
https://coffman.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/coffman-legislation
-streamlines-modernizes-va-procurement-process (quoting Colorado Rep. Mike
Coffman) (“The VA has wasted billions of dollars due to bureaucratic incompetence
and an inability to follow existing procurement rules.”).
182. See supra Sections IV.A.3–4.
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Importantly, any legislative action should preserve the intent of
Congress, which has been clarified by some of the key legislators who
supported the original statute and made it law.183 It is also critical to
avoid the mistakes of the Federal Circuit, which “found that the VA
did not have to use the Vets First mandate when it had satisfied its
VOSB goals.”184 This Note submits that there is at least one way to
satisfy both requirements. The proposed action would be threefold.
First, Congress could raise the aspirational goal for VA
procurements through VOSBs and SDOSBs to a level more closely
tied to the “ceiling,” rather than the “floor.”185 Instead of an agency
contracting goal of 3%, perhaps 30% is more palatable and ensures
a strong commitment to veterans by the agency designed to serve
them. According to the members of Congress who filed briefs on
behalf of Kingdomware, the Legislature “wanted the VA not just to
meet, but to exceed its goals.”186 It is unlikely, however, that this would
be true of a goal as lofty as 30% of a $20 billion VA contracting
budget. It certainly would be illogical to expect the entire VA budget,
or even half, to be awarded to VOSBs. Otherwise, why would
Congress not mandate that all VA contracts go to veterans?
Additionally, it may be the opinion of some congressional
members that there is a “strong interest in maximizing veterans’
business opportunities and in supporting small business . . . [that]
does not disappear and reappear depending on whether the VA has
met self-imposed annual goals,”187 but perhaps Congress should
create equitable opportunities for other disadvantaged concerns
that stand to lose their livelihoods to veterans.188 Perhaps Congress
would feel more confident that the VA was putting veterans first if
the agency was required to meet a lofty 30% goal, as this Note
proposes. Surely, at ten times the original goal set in 2003, the VA

183. See Brief of Members of Congress as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
supra note 149, at 6–12.
184. See Hearing, supra note 8 (statement of Jonathan T. Williams, Partner,
PilieroMazza PLLC, at 3) (“The Federal Circuit essentially viewed the VOSB goals
as a ceiling, rather than a floor, which could have been a dangerous precedent for
all small business programs. Indeed, the small business contracting goals are the
bare minimum Congress expects from federal agencies.”).
185. See id.
186. Brief of Members of Congress as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
supra note 149, at 10.
187. Id. at 14.
188. See supra Section IV.A.4.
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could not be accused of neglecting the brave men and women who
sacrifice so much for their country.
Second, Congress could institute quarterly accounting of the
agency’s progress in attaining this goal. The issue of whether a single
contracting officer could know if the agency’s goals had or had not
been attained at any given moment was raised at multiple levels of
the Kingdomware decision.189 However, the Court itself never
determined if this type of on-the-fly calculation was possible; it simply
determined that it was unnecessary given the prefatory nature of the
goal language.190 It seems likely, however, that a VA-wide contracting
calculation could be made at the end of each fiscal quarter. Surely,
with all the reports that the VA is already required to produce,191

189. Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 754 F.3d 923, 937 (Fed. Cir.
2014), rev’d and remanded, 136 S. Ct. 1969 (2016).
[T]here is no evidence in the record to show that VA contracting officers
rely on, or have access to, these types of data in making contracting
decisions, and the GAO has explicitly held that an agency’s belief it has
satisfied its small business goals does not affect its obligation to conduct
a Rule of Two analysis.
Id.
Congress was well aware that this would be an impossible task for the VA,
which does not keep track of its actual procurement spending or the
distribution of that spending in real-time. Although the VA must report
most contracts to the Federal Procurement Data System (“FPDS”) within
three business days of the contract award, see 48 C.F.R. § 4.604(b)(2),
the FPDS data does not have to be certified as complete and accurate
until 120 days after the fiscal year ends, id. § 4.604(c). Additionally, while
the VA must measure the extent of participation by small businesses for
each fiscal year, the VA does not have to report that data to the Small
Business Administration (“SBA”) until the end of the fiscal year, see id.
§ 19.202-5(b), and, in fact, these reports often take half of the following
fiscal year to compile, see Press Release, SBA, SBA Announces Results of
2014 Small Business Federal Procurement Scorecard, U.S. Small Bus. Admin.
(June 24, 2015), http://tinyurl.com/pm7wszt (announcing, six months
behind schedule, the small business results for fiscal year 2014).
Brief of Members of Congress as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note
149, at 18–19.
190. Kingdomware, 136 S. Ct. at 1979 (“We hold that the Rule of Two contracting
procedures in § 8127(d) are not limited to those contracts necessary to fulfill the
Secretary’s goals under § 8127(a).”).
191. See Contractor Reporting Requirements, GSA VENDOR SUPPORT CTR.,
https://vsc.gsa.gov/administration/crr.cfm (last visited Mar. 30, 2017) (“The
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) National Acquisition Center negotiates,
awards, and administers Federal Supply Schedule (FSS) contracts for various
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data collection and analysis of this type would not be a substantial
burden. In the interest of equity, Congress could mandate timely
reporting practices and provide the resources necessary to
accomplish such a task. Moreover, meeting this goal of 30% need
not be tied to exact annual spending. Instead, it could be an estimate
based on the projected costs of the total procurement contracts for
that quarter compared with the amount that was awarded to VOSBs.
It hardly appears likely that the VA has any malicious intent or
interest in excluding veteran small-business owners from the
agency’s contracting process. Therefore, Congress should trust the
VA to make a good faith evaluation of whether or not it has met the
30% goal in a given quarter before it determines the necessary setaside practices for the next quarter.
Third, Congress could declare that the VA would be required to
consider all other disadvantaged concerns on equal footing with
veteran-owned businesses for a quarter when the percentage of
SDVOSBs and VOSBs used in contracts is above the 30% threshold.
In this way, if the VA were to meet its aspirational goal for one
quarter, the statute would allow other disadvantaged concerns a
chance to reap the benefits of the Rule of Two and provide them
access to the VA’s large budget. Then, at the beginning of the next
quarter, the VA would be required to again put “veterans first” if the
VA had not satisfied its 30% goal. The balance of VA contracting
would therefore be stilted in favor of veterans, but the agency would
have the ability to tilt the scales in favor of other disadvantaged
concerns who would also benefit from government contracting
opportunities once veterans had taken their share.
While this system of accounting may appear convoluted, it is
surely a more equitable solution than to simply hand the lion’s share
of a $20 billion government budget to SDVOSBs and VOSBs at the
cost of all other disadvantaged groups. Additionally, this plan would
not completely tie the agency’s hands. The VA would still retain its
discretion to find the “best value” for the United States192 but would
be prevented from “abandon[ing] any interest in fostering veteranowned businesses until the start of the next fiscal [quarter].”193

healthcare-related products and services. All VA managed FSS contract holders are
required to report contract sales on a quarterly basis.”).
192. 38 U.S.C. § 8127(d) (2012).
193. Brief of Members of Congress as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner,
supra note 149, at 7.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Court in Kingdomware came to the correct legal conclusion
based on the principles of statutory interpretation, but strict reading
of the relevant text upends the status quo and is likely to lead to
unsavory results for the VA, other contracting government agencies,
and nonveteran-owned contractors. Outcomes will include
inefficiencies, discrepancies in practice across government agencies,
and loss of opportunities for other disadvantaged groups. These
problems may require corrective action from either Congress or the
government agencies in question, as evidenced by congressional
testimony and agency memoranda.194 While Kingdomware is cause for
celebration among veterans and narrow constructionists, it may
create a headache for the United States government, because it
presents consequences beyond what even the eminent legal minds
of the Court had envisioned. It is imperative that Congress take
corrective action to smooth out the inefficiencies and restore equity
to government contracting practices. Otherwise, government
agencies ranging from the Department of Justice to the SBA will be
hauled into court to face more contentious litigation in the near
future. Congress may be hesitant to act, and litigation can take years.
Therefore, in all likelihood it will be some time before Kingdomware’s
exact implications are realized.195

194.
195.

See supra Section IV.B.
Id.
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